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Abstract
Firms compete in model of horizontal differentiation a la Hotelling. They use two−part tariffs
but the market is such that, in equilibrium, it is not fully covered (firms are then local
monopolies). The question we adressed in this paper is to determine what kind of subsidies
are the best instruments to increase the coverage at the lowets cost. This paper shows first
that an ad valorem subsidy on the usage price is a less costly instrument to increase the
coverage than a per unit subsidy.
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A recurrent debate in publiceconomics is the studyof commodity taxationwhen ¿rms use linear prices.
This topic has been the subject of many works1. The main result that emerges from this literature is
that the type of taxation used matters as soon as there exists imperfect competition. Then, before
looking at the level a commodity should be taxed, governments have to deal with the question of the
balance between different types of commodity taxes (generally between ad valorem and unit taxation)2.
However, the question of commodity taxation when ¿rms use two-part tariffs (or other general tariffs)
has not received much attention by public economists even if this kind of tariffs are more and more
used in practice.
The main problem with the taxation of good produced by a non linear pricing monopolist is to
justify public intervention. Indeed, by using discriminating prices a monopolist can extract all the
consumers’ surplus and then produces ef¿ciently (¿rst best). However, Laffont (1987) shows that if
there is asymmetric information or if there exists a cost of public funds there is room for commodity
taxation. Laffont then studies the sign of the tax and shows that this sign depends on the cost of public
funds and on the cost of the informational rent the government has to leave to the ¿rm. The question
of the type of tax is not addressed in this paper. Cheung (1998) deals with this problem. The author
compares a speci¿c tax and an ad valorem one on the tariff when a monopoly uses a non linear tariff to
discriminate among consumers. The author shows that the result of Skeath and Trandel (1994) could
be generalized to the case of non linear pricing: the ad valorem tax Pareto dominates the speci¿c
one. Then, even with a non linear pricing ¿rm, the question of the type of commodity tax to use is of
signi¿cant relevance.
In this note we will take a different approach to justify public intervention. We focus on a good
that is produced by local monopolies. In this kind of industry, some consumers are not served because
they are ’too far’ from one of the monopolies. As a consequence, the market is not fully served. A
government might then want to increase the market coverage by using subsidization. This question has
been the topic of discussions between the French government and GSM networks3.
To study this question, we will use the model of linear city due to Hotelling4. Moreover, we will
focus on particular non linear prices namely two-part tariffs. This tariff are made of a usage fee (per
unit price) and of a subscription fee. The main objective of the paper is to know what kind of subsidies
the government should use. After a brief description of the model (section 2) and of the equilibrium
(section 3), we compare, in section 4, the use of a per unit subsidy to the use of an ad valorem one on
the usage fee. In section 5, we turn to the comparison between the subsidization of the subscription
fee and the ad valorem one on the per unit price. Finally, section 6 sums up the result and gives some
concluding remarks.
1See the thorough survey of Keen (1998).
2See for instance Delipalla-Keen (1992), Skeath-Trandel (1994)or Suits-Musgrave (1953). Moreover, a speci¿c is also
called a unit tax.
3In France, 1480 cities are not connected to any GSM networks.
4We will suppose that the localizations of the ¿rms are given.
12 The model
We consider competition in a linear city model between two ¿rms. The two ¿rms have the same cost
structure. Serving a customer involves a ¿xed cost s. Moreover, the per unit cost S, is constant and is
the same for all consumers. Total cost is then the per customer cost multiplied by the number of served
customers. The ¿rms use a particular type of non linear prices, two-part tariff. Each ¿rm proposes one
two-part tariff, which is noted, for ¿rm , by
A
￿ E^ ' 
￿ n R
￿ ^c
where ^ is the quantity consumed by a customer. Moreover, 
￿ , the ¿xed fee, can be viewed as a
subscription fee for telephone services and R
￿ , the variable fee (or usage fee) as the price per minute of
communication5. The pro¿t per consumer served is noted Z
￿ ER
￿ c 
￿ , the total pro¿t of ¿rm  is then this
per consumer pro¿t times the number of subscribers (the number of consumers connected to network
) and is noted by 
￿ .
Consumers are uniformly located on the segment dfc o. Moreover, ¿rms are located6 at the extrem-
ities of the segment, namely ¿rm  is at %
￿ ' f and ¿rm 2 at %
￿ ' . A consumer located at %, who
subscribes and consumes ^ units of the good produced by ¿rm , has a utility
U n E^ n   B m%  %
￿ m,
where U is theincome of the consumer, is the ¿xed surplus. This surplus is, for thetelecommunication
example, the utility obtained by being connected to one of the two networks7. The income and ¿xed
surplus are the same for all consumers. The term B m%  %
￿ m represents the cost, borne by the consumer,
not to consume her most favorite good (or not to be connected to her most favorite network)8. The













So, when a customer faces a usage fee R the quantity consumed ^ is such that

￿




This variable gross surplus, then yields a constant elasticity demand function. Moreover, the elasticity
of demand, namely #, is assumed to be greater than 9. All the customers of ¿rm  buy the same




￿  ' ER
￿   
￿
5
D could be the right to enter in an entertainment park, and then s is the price of an attraction in the park. An other
possible interpretation could be to see D as the price to enter in a night-club and s the price of a drink in this night-club.
6Then, in this paper we do not consider the localisation game between the two ¿rms.
7This surplus might be seen as the utility to be in the park.
8This cost does not depend on the quantity purchased. By relaxing this assumption, we will obtain a demand that
depends on the quantity purchased. This could be a possible extension of this work.
9These assumptions of constant elasticity of demand and that the elasticity is greater than one are made for technical
convenience.
2where ER
￿  is the variable net surplus which is such that
ER


















There can be three types of equilibria in this kind of model10:
 type one, the consumer who is indifferent between buying from the two ¿rms strictly prefers
buying to not buying, there is full coverage.
 type two, the consumer who is indifferent between buying from the two ¿rms is also indifferent
between buying and not buying, there is also full coverage.
 type three, type one, the consumer who is indifferent between buying from the two ¿rms strictly
prefers not buying to buying. Then, the sets of consumer buying from each ¿rm is separate.
There is limited participation, each ¿rm’s demand is only affected by its own tariff, ¿rms are then
local monopolies.
In this note we will only focus on type three equilibria11. This type of equilibria appears if the ¿xed
utility  is small enough. Indeed, the utility of the consumer who is indifferent between buying from
the two ¿rms is such that
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Moreover, the market share, k
￿ , of ¿rm  is such that the utility of the last subscriber (the one who is
the most distant from ¿rm ) is equal to zero, ER
￿   
￿ n   Bk












The government’s objective function is to increase the coverage of the market for many possible
reasons (network externalities, universal service, local development...) for the least possible expense.
The government can use three types of subsidies to enhance the coverage:
 a speci¿c subsidy (or per unit one), noted r For each unit of the good sold, the ¿rm receives a
¿xed amount r and then r is a subsidy on the volume of sales
 an ad valorem subsidy on the per unit price, noted j12, so j is a subsidy on the value of sales
 an ad valorem subsidy on the subscription fee, noted P which decreases the cost of serving a new
consumer.
The public expenditure, per ¿rm, is noted  .





￿ . The question
we address here is to determine which instrument the government has to use.
10See Mas Colell, Whinston and Green (1995) chapter 12 for more details on the different type of equilibrium.
11In a companion paper (Boldron 2001), type one equilibria are studied.
12The rate  is expressed as a percentage of the consumer price (tax-inclusive). The results are not affected with a
tax-exclusive rate which expresses subsidy as a proportion of the producer price.
33 The Equilibrium
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But, it is equivalent here to see competition as one in which ¿rms choose the net surplus 
￿ and the
usage fee rather the ¿xed fee and the usage fee. In this case pro¿ts are given by

￿ ' kE dE n PEER  
￿ n E n jR^  ES  r^R  s o 
The ¿rst order conditions13 then give (for both ¿rms as they are symmetric):
R '
#ES  r









dE n PEER n  n E n jR^  ES  r^  s o  (5)
We only consider situations where some consumers are not served, then it restricts the possible
value of the subsidies we study. As the set of all possible values of subsidies that lead to a situation
where market shares are such that k
￿ n k
￿ 	  is hard to characterized, we will assume all along
this paper that we compare subsidies that belong to this set. One can remark that if there is no public
intervention (all the subsidies are equal to zero), the per unit price is equal to the marginal cost. Then,
except when there exists a cost of public funds there is no need to set a tax on this market.

























The three subsidies all reduce the price and then could allow the ¿rm to increase their market shares
but also the subscription fees.
13We do not consider here second order conditions and we supposed that they are veri¿ed.
44 Comparison between ad valorem subsidy and speci¿c subsidy
In this section, we compare this two instruments with P ' f as it does not change our result but leads
to a clearer exposition. From the marginal effect on price derive in the previous section (relations 6, 7
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Then, there is never overshifting (except when we start from the ’no intervention’ point) which means
here that the drop in the price is smaller than the subsidy. This indicates that ¿rms have a strategic use
of the subsidies. This observation suggests that ad valorem and unit taxation will have different effects
on the equilibrium.













This types of subsidies, even if they are not directly linked with market shares, are then useful for the
government as they increase the market coverage14. Moreover, we can derive the effect on per ¿rm














































￿ is positive as M is small, in





































The (marginal) increase of coverage per unit of public expenditure is greater with the use of the ad
valorem subsidy than with the use of the speci¿c one. hence, from this order relation we can write the
following proposition.
Proposition 1 In order to increase the market coverage, it is less costly for the government to use an
ad valorem subsidy than a per unit one.
14Those marginal effects of subsidies are true for negative values (taxation). Subsidies are then the right tools to increase
market shares.
5By increasing the subsidy, whatever the type, the government reduces the marginal cost of ¿rms.
This creates an incentive for ¿rms to decrease the per unit price. But, by doing so, ¿rms could also
increase their market share and/or the subscription fee. But an ad valorem subsidy has two other effects
in comparison to the unit one. First, it reduces the per consumer ¿xed cost and, second, decreases the
value of the subscription fees. This appears clearly by rewriting the per consumer pro¿t as:
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Then, in a sense, with an ad valorem subsidy the ¿rm has more incentives to increase its market share.
KowalczckandSkeath(1994)shows that, inthecontext ofinternational trade andwithlinearprices,
thetariffs shouldbespeci¿csubsidieswhenthegoodisproducedbyforeignmonopolies. Moreover, the
results of Suits and Musgrave (1953) with a monopoly or of Delipalla and Keen (1992) in a Cournot
oligopoly reverse15 when we consider subsidization rather than taxation: for a given price the total
amount of subsidies is less important with a per unit one. Then, in those cases, the government should
use the speci¿c subsidy. Here, we do not reach this conclusion but the opposite. This is an other illus-
tration of the fact that the choice of the instrument also depends on the objective of the government16.
5 Subsidization of the price versus subsidization of the subscrip-
tion fee
The government has no incentive to use the speci¿c subsidy compare to the ad valorem one on the
usage fee. Then, in this section, we try to compare the subsidy on the subscription fee (we keep the per
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which could be positive or negative. This comes from the fact that one way to receive more subsidies
is to increase the subscription fee, which might lead to a decrease in the market coverage. This effect
does not appear for the subsidy on the usage fee. Indeed, in order to receive more subsidies, the ¿rm
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￿ : f, it is not tractable to have a clear ranking of the two instruments. Nevertheless,
we could write the following proposition.
15See Boldron and Hariton (2001).
16See Pirttilä (1997) or Keen (1998).
6Proposition 2 In order to increase the market coverage, it is less costly for the government to use the
subsidy on the usage fee than the one on the subscription fee:
 if it starts from the ’no intervention’ point, Ejc P ' Efc fc
 or if there is no ¿xed cost per consumer.
The proof is detailed in the appendix. The ¿rst part of the proposition gives us the feeling that if
a small subsidy is needed then it is better to use the ad valorem subsidy on the usage fee. The second
part of the proposition is quite intuitive. Firms choose  and R, which determine k in such a way that
the more the ¿xed cost s is small the more the market share is important. But if there is no ¿xed cost,
the only way to increase the market share is to generate a larger consumer surplus, which means a drop
in the price. Then, the better instrument is the usage fee subsidy because it is directly linked with the
value of the sale17.
6 Concluding remarks
The agreement between the French government and the GSM networks has the following features: a
reduction of the VAT on all networks revenues (in particular on the ¿xed fees and on the per minute
of communication price) and a subsidization of the relay antennas. This agreement is quite consistent
with our results as the reduction of the VAT rate is an ad valorem subsidization. Moreover, by building
some antennas, the government reduces indirectly a part of the consumer ¿xed cost.
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Appendix
Proof of proposition 2. Consider the marginal effect on the market share of a marginal change of P
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Moreover, we have the marginal effect on public expenditures,  .
￿ ' k


































































8But in Efc f the price is equal to the marginal cost (from relation (3)), then we must have  : s in


























which demonstrates the ¿rst part of the proposition.
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then when j : P then it is better to use the subsidy on the usage fee. But in Efc f the government will
use j, then it always will.
9